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Seven Pillars
of Small War
Power

Randy Borum, Ph.D.

“We have to diminish the idea that technology is going to change warfare . . .
War is primarily a human endeavor.”
— General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces and NATO Supreme Allied Command
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____________
PHOTO: The fall of the Berlin Wall,
1989. Former Check Point Charlie,
Berlin. (photographer unknown)

HE WORLD SEEMED to breathe a collective sigh of relief at the end
of the long Cold War. That momentous event, however, did not mark the
end of global armed conflict. While the number of armed conflicts worldwide
has been declining since peaking in the early 1990s,1 and a conventional war
between two large states seems unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future,
community conflicts and a “growing number of increasingly disorderly
spaces” that may facilitate even more such conflicts now characterize the
global security environment.2
Citizens of our globalized community may no longer need to lie anxiously
awake in their beds at night, wondering if the world will be there in the
morning, but the current climate of disorder may cause death by a thousand small cuts. These are “small wars,”3 insurgencies,4 localized intrastate
civil conflicts that emerge from disruptive political, economic, and social
problems. Nearly 80 percent of the surges in armed violence over the past
decade were recurring conflicts, which should remind us—if we needed
further reminding—that attending to post-conflict transitions is an integral
part of any intervention.5
These conflicts have most often involved failed or failing states, or
anocracies—a purgatory-style regime that blends elements of democracy
and autocracy, without the stabilizing benefits of either.6 Nearly three out of
every four post-Cold War international crises have involved failed or failing states, and according to the Failed States Index (sponsored jointly by
Fund For Peace and Foreign Policy magazine) the number of countries on
“alert” status has shown a modest but steady increase for the past four to five
years.7 Anocratic regime states are more than twice as likely to experience
instability and violent conflict.
This violence involves competing militias, warring ethnic groups, warlords, illicit transnational networks, and informal paramilitary organizations
not bound by conventional “laws of war.” The illegitimate offspring of criminal combatants dominate gray zones and lawless “no-go areas,” using their
ill-gotten gains to fund conflict and buy operational and logistical support.
This is the reality of the nightmarish nexus of crime and terror.8
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Small wars are not a new development, and
America is certainly no stranger to fighting them.
However, fighting them effectively requires more
than just experience.13 The U.S. Armed Forces
have put tremendous effort into learning lessons
from past conflicts to help them adapt to new
contingencies, but as the transition from Iraq to
Afghanistan demonstrated, the next conflict is not
like the last one.14
The history of insurgency and small wars—
including contemporary ones—tells us that
understanding the human dimension of a conflict
is critically important. There is much more to the
human dimension than knowing an adversary’s
culture. Even a deep grasp of culture and social
dynamics is not sufficient to win a war (though
a deficient understanding may be enough to lose
one). Strategy should place less emphasis on
national-level planning and more on the local
community level. The state remains relevant as a
basic unit in the international system, but today’s

(AP Photo/Jerome Delay)

These ugly struggles typically have complicated—if not chaotic—origins, and they tend to
last for a long time.9 They are notoriously difficult
to end, and it is always difficult to determine who
won. Their enduring character is due, in part, to
the indiscriminate nature of their violence, which
seeks to break the will of the adversary by destroying homes, institutions, and infrastructure, which
breeds a “never forget” mentality in their enemies.10
Warring factions may have either little choice
or little incentive to end the conflict. Some want
it to continue because of “greed rather than
grievance,” since it provides them power, status,
or money they would not have in its absence.11
Some continue just because it is what they have
always done. Child soldiers are increasingly
lured into these struggles, creating a generation
that knows only how to fight and has virtually no
other skills, experience, or prospects. They fight
because that’s all they know how to do—driving
what some have called “supply-side war.”12

Anti-Gaddafi rebels hoist a child with an AK-47 and flash the “V for Victory” sign, Tripoli, 20 March 2011.
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fragmented, complex conflicts often require us to
dig deeper. Insurgencies and movements of resistance become living systems.15 They—almost
literally—take on lives of their own.
Ultimately, insurgencies usually do not win,
but their degree of strategic success certainly
exceeds their disadvantaged size, military
strength, and sophistication. They do this by
leveraging their strengths in an asymmetric way.
The resulting dynamics—some of which are
obvious—work in their favor. Of course, insurgent movements must address the fundamental
problems facing all armed groups, regardless
of their history, motivations, or goals. Anthony
Vinci describes these as the three basic problems
of mobilization. 16 The insurgent needs people
who want to fight (motivation); the means of
force, including weapons and survivability
(logistics); and the ability to exercise direction
(leadership, organization, and communications).
The basic tasks themselves are relatively
straightforward, but how militants approach them
determines whether they are successful in the
political and psychological spheres of conflict.
Those spheres serve as the insurgents’ fulcrum for
exerting asymmetric power.
In the sections that follow, I outline seven significant sources of power for insurgencies and
resistance movements:
●● The power of rising expectations.
●● The power of the people.
●● The power of the underdog.
●● The power of agility.
●● The power of resistance.
●● The power of security.
●● The power of belonging.
Understanding them can help explain how and
why some insurgencies succeed while others do
not, and help shape strategies for countering them.
This article is a heuristic, not a historiography.
The nature and mechanisms of power are dynamic
and often context dependent. Exceptions exist
for nearly every rule. With that caveat, I offer my
thoughts on the following pillars of small war
power.

Power of Rising Expectations

“While poverty has rarely been a driving force
for revolutionary movements and wars, rising
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2011

(USAID)

SEVEN PILLARS

A soldier teaches children the dangers of land mines,
Rwanda, 25 June 2007.

expectations often have.”—Joint Operating Environment, 2008.
Insurgency offers the hope of advancement,
ascension, or freedom. By definition, insurgencies
are aspirational. Insurgents do not have a defensive
“bunker mentality”; revolutionary calls to action
advance the cause—to make life better, to gain
essential freedoms. “Without rising aspirations and
expectations, society would not make the effort and
take the risks to acquire new forms of behavior
to achieve greater results.”17 In that sense, rising
expectations empower regime resistance.18
For centuries, the impoverished and oppressed,
especially in undeveloped areas of the world, suffered profoundly from “want,” but resigned themselves to their fates. Many of the “have-nots” had no
notion of the lives of the “haves.” They may have
wished for things to be different, but with no knowledge of anything beyond their own communities,
they had no sense of what different might look like,
much less that it might be attainable. Globalization
and technology have changed that.
Today, the competitive aspirations of communities may become even more intense than those
of nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in
37

comments to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign
on 15 July 2008, forecast that “Over the next 20
years and more, certain pressures—population,
resources, energy, economic and environmental climates—could combine with rapid cultural, social,
and technological change to produce new sources of
deprivation, rage, and instability . . . [such that] the
most persistent and potentially dangerous threats
will come less from ambitious states than failing
ones that cannot meet the basic needs—much less
the aspirations—of their people.” The power of
rising expectations in fueling conflict is likely to
get worse before it gets better.
Early conflict theories advanced the idea that poverty and deprivation were “root causes” of political
violence. Subsequent evidence has demonstrated
quite clearly that poverty alone is neither a substantial cause nor a robust predictor.19 (Some suggest a
more nuanced idea, that perhaps the dynamic is one
of relative deprivation.20) Research does not support the idea that discontent is sufficient to inspire
collective political violence.21 However, discontent
is one thing and injustice is quite another. Framing
a problem as an injustice permits the insurgent to
transform the people’s expectations into action.22
Most theories of radicalization and extremist
ideology have some element of grievance as a foundational element.23 But why do some grievances
incite action while others do not? One key reason
seems to be that those affected view the grievance as
an injustice.24 The contrast between the way things
are (what the people have) and the way they think
things should be (what they should have) fuels these
perceptions. Rising expectations heighten that gap,
creating a climate that engenders grievances of inequity. This, in essence, is where relative deprivation
leads to perceptions of absolute injustice.25
When the aggrieved see that others do not suffer,
or have overcome suffering—perhaps through
revolutionary violence—what once was annoying
now seems unfair. Because people do not regard

Framing a problem as an
injustice permits the insurgent to transform the people’s
expectations into action.
38

injustices as random events, it is not difficult to
place blame on a certain target—a policy, person,
or nation. The blamed party is then vilified—often
demonized—which inspires the aggrieved to take
action to remedy the injustices against them.26

Power of the Underdog

“The underdog often starts the fight, and occasionally the upper dog deserves to win.”—Edgar
Watson Howe
An insurgent movement is nearly always viewed
as an underdog. We generally identify and define an
underdog in relation to a more favored entity—a “top
dog.” We regard the underdog as being or having
“less than” the top dog. People like to root for the
underdog—especially when there is some glimmer
of hope that the aspirations of the disadvantaged
party will prevail. Although we widely recognize
the underdog’s appeal, the mechanisms by which it
happens are complicated.27
Not surprisingly, a great deal of research shows
that people do not like to identify themselves as
losers.28 So what accounts for the urge to root for
or join the underdog? It’s a question that social
scientists have only recently started to untangle.29
A couple of lessons are starting to emerge from
research in marketing and social psychology. Bear in
mind that most of the research done on the underdog
phenomenon has considered fans of different sports
teams or consumers of certain product brands, not
insurgencies.
First, while most people try to view themselves
positively and wish others to do the same, top dog
supporters focus on the outcome of performance,
while underdog supporters focus on the positive
and attractive qualities of the “players” themselves
and on the importance of the domain in their own
lives.30 Second, sustained support does not require
the underdog to put in a stellar performance, but
there must at least be intermittent glimmers of
hope. Stated differently, “underdogs need to come
close upon occasion or at least show flashes of
potential in order to merit support; otherwise they
are just losers and nobody expects anything from
them.”31 Two additional points are worth mentioning about the underdog’s appeal. One is his
perceived persistence and tenacity in the face of
adversity, a quality others admire and with which
many wish to identify. In addition, support for the
July-August 2011  MILITARY REVIEW
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Power of Agility

Rule 1: “Many and small” beats “few and
large.”—John Arquilla
One of the great challenges in countering insurgent movements is that they are moving targets.
Their structure, organization, and tactics are fluid.
They are constantly adapting, evolving, and morphing. Although some insurgent groups historically
have had a more centralized, paramilitary structure,
the insurgencies of the 21st century are predominantly decentralized, dynamic, and agile.34
Agility is a force’s ability to adapt, to learn, and
to change (in a timely way) to meet the threats it
faces.35 Effective insurgent movements are both
structurally and culturally agile. Agile insurgent
movements are not only resilient to adversity and
change, but they also are responsive to it, and they
adapt accordingly. Setting aside for a moment the
debate about whether Al-Qaeda is a global insurgency movement, consider its agility and evolution.
What began as a “services support bureau” for
Afghans resisting Soviet occupation subsequently
became a “base” for operations by existing terrorist
groups, then the notional hub of a global network of

(U.S. Army photo by PFC Sarah De Boise)

underdog seems to be rooted in people’s perceptions of fairness and justice.32 Underdogs are at a
disadvantage in competition with top dogs. If the
disadvantaged can succeed, then success—in the
grand scheme of things—seems more attainable,
fairer, and more equitable.
If even some of these dynamics apply in armed
civil conflicts, the power of the underdog is
potentially quite important for insurgent movements. For the past 35 years, psychologists have
investigated a phenomenon they call the “bask
in reflected glory” effect.33 Basically, this occurs
when a person associates himself with a group or
institution that has status, a reputation of popularity, or success (even though the person has had
nothing to do with that success). Consider how
some sports fans (a term derived from the word
“fanatic”) discuss their favorite teams using the
pronoun “we,” and you get the idea. This effect
is quite possibly a major factor driving the success of an insurgent or terrorist “brand” and the
reason why more hangers-on seem to associate
themselves with such groups than the groups
themselves would recognize as associates.

U.S. Army soldiers speak with the family members of a former Al-Qaeda member during a “cordon and search” of the
town of Jedda, Iraq, 4 June 2008.
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new “affiliate” organizations, then a kind of social
movement, and ultimately, a “brand” or inspirational hub for a virulent and violent ideology.36
Being agile and adaptive has advantages. Agility
is perhaps the single most important factor in organizational learning. The U.S. Army, of course, has
invested millions of dollars in developing repositories for “lessons learned” and has assessed and
identified critical changes necessary for it to adapt
to the current global security environment.37 But
these extensive efforts do not guarantee actionable
adaptations.38 By nature, if not by design, conventional forces tend to be large, heavy, and slow. That
posture works well in conventional theater operations but not so well in insurgencies or small wars.39
A lean, flexible, and decentralized organization
can move much more quickly from idea to action.
It can maintain greater compartmentalization to
enhance operational security and reduce risks from
extensive, prolonged communications. It can shift
quickly between kinetic attacks and psychological
or political activity. It can move money, mobilize
personnel, and replenish losses in leadership more
easily. The counterinsurgent is typically running to
catch up, only to find that when he figures something out, it has changed or is no longer important.
Agility is a highly effective force multiplier, especially against a large, plodding adversary.

Power of the People

The richest source of power to wage war lies in
the masses of the people.–Mao Tse-tung
Contemporary insurgents have a clear home-field
advantage, which they often exploit to great effect.
Because insurgents, particularly revolutionaries, take
up the mantle of resistance, they ostensibly represent
the people. The extent to which the population perceives their rhetoric as reality drives its support.40
Chairman Mao referred to a style of small wars as
“people’s wars.”
In population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine,
the people are the counterinsurgent’s focus of effort
and the prize for success.41 Accordingly, many have
come to regard insurgencies and attempts to counter
them as essentially “battles for the hearts and minds”
of the people.42 What may not be immediately apparent, though, is that this battle does not begin at a zero
baseline for each side. At the outset, the insurgency
proclaims itself as the justice-seeking voice and
40

Gaining the support of the
people is both the insurgents’
primary strategy and their primary
objective.
representative of the people. The counterinsurgent
must earn, cajole, and maneuver to win the population to his side. The insurgent arguably already has
them, and needs only to retain or not alienate them.
Consider in-group and out-group distinctions (“us”
and “them”).43 Two common dynamics that tend to
drive in-group-out-group (intergroup) relationships
are in-group favoritism (a tendency to evaluate and
behave more favorably toward in-group members)
and out-group derogation (a tendency to evaluate and behave more negatively toward out-group
members).44
Popular support is not only the “richest source
of power” but also the richest source of energy and
momentum for the insurgency. Popular support is not
a sufficient condition for success, but it is necessary
for resistance to thrive. From a psychological perspective, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent
would like the population to identify with their group
and oppose the other group.45
To draw persons into the in-group, the insurgency
crafts its narrative with an “insider voice,” while
embedding itself physically and unobtrusively
throughout the civil population. Insurgents follow
Mao Tse-tung’s maxim that “the guerrilla must move
amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” They
aim to be indistinguishable from the people, becoming their voice and amplifying the threat posed by
the out-group counterinsurgent with persistent propaganda and misinformation. This has the dual effect
of making the in-group (that they have created) more
cohesive and increasing opposition to the regime.
Gaining the support of the people is both the insurgents’ primary strategy and their primary objective.
Chairman Mao said, “Weapons are an important
factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people,
not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength
is not only a contest of military and economic power,
but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by
people.”
July-August 2011  MILITARY REVIEW
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All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles
more surmountable than those of human resistance.
			
— Sir B.H. Liddell Hart
Insurgents do not just use asymmetric tactics; they
do so in the context of asymmetric strategies. The
insurgent’s most fundamental objective is simply to
thwart the counterinsurgent’s objectives. We may
think of this as “monkey wrench power.” Throwing
a monkey wrench is a form of sabotage. The purpose
of sabotage is to interfere with a competitor’s goals
and interests and to create disorder. Disorder is the
strategic friend of the insurgent and the foe of the
regime.
Insurgent movements often do not aim for decisive
victory, but rather to prevent the counterinsurgent
from achieving victory. They seek to be winning,
not necessarily to be victorious. To be winning, the
insurgent need only to disrupt, break, and resist. He
does not have to build, create, or sustain. In nearly
every way, the insurgent’s burden is much easier
than that of the counterinsurgent. Henry Kissinger
noted nearly a half century ago, “The guerrilla wins
if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if
it does not win.”46 This asymmetry is the essence of
resistance and it gives the insurgent an enormous
advantage.
The asymmetries of constraint further multiply the
insurgency’s power. The insurgent has much more
tactical latitude to resist than the state has to quell the
resistance. Insurgent tactics are constrained only by
the ethos and popular support of the people. As long
as the insurgent is able to take the people’s side, he
can largely use any means they wish.
The insurgent’s grand strategy of “not losing”
involves persistently provoking, disrupting, and
exhausting counterinsurgent forces. The insurgents
provoke the state, hoping counterinsurgent forces
will overreact with excessive force. The resisters then
flaunt and leverage that regime’s response in order
to mobilize their own popular support.
They disrupt the counterinsurgent with every
demonstration of active resistance (since the counterinsurgent’s goal is to stop the resistance) and by
showing the populace that the state cannot ensure the
security of its people. Few tactics are more effective
in this regard than intermittent, indiscriminant acts
of violence. Creating a climate of fear and general
disorder further undermines the regime’s legitimacy.
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2011

Finally, insurgents exhaust regime forces by draining their fiscal and personnel resources, compelling
them to protect “everything” and rebuild what the
insurgent has destroyed, while thwarting their ability
to capitalize on any success or to gain any momentum. Few forces and certainly few nations have
the political will to persist against such prolonged
adversity.

Power of Belonging

Comradeship makes a man feel warm and courageous when all his instincts tend to make him cold
and afraid.—Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery
Insurgent movements offer a way to belong, to
be part of something bigger than oneself, to experience the bonds of affiliation, and to be empowered
with a role that has meaning and purpose.47 These
are powerful—if intangible—rewards for the most
vulnerable subgroup of prospective members. The
promise of belonging draws them in, and if properly
managed, keeps them engaged and loyal.48 Loyalty
is most often built on a platform of connectedness,
a shared identity, and a shared sense of belonging.
Observations on recruitment within terrorist and
violent extremist organizations show that many
people join to gain solidarity with family, friends,
or acquaintances.49 “For the individuals who become
active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the
group, or community of believers, rather than to an
abstract ideology or to violence.”50 As is true for
many forms of collective violence, from terrorism

(USAID)

Power of Resistance

USAID-supported rehabilitation programs assist in returning these young boys to a normal society, Rwanda, 25
June 2007.
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bulge,” about 87 percent of world’s populations
between the ages of 10 and 19 now live in developing countries, many of which are furnaces of political instability stoked by curtailed modernity and an
ethos of nonstate belonging and boundaries.55 This
suggests perhaps that the highest risk group for an
uprising—demographically and psychosocially—is
now densely concentrated in the world’s riskiest and
most volatile spaces.

Power of Security

Most people want security in this world, not
liberty.—H.L. Mencken
Budding insurgents often find within the movement an essential sense of physical, social, and
emotional security. Physically, there is strength in
numbers. Socially, mutual accountability and trust
breeds loyalty. Emotionally, the ideology, doctrine,
and rules of the group provide a reassuring sense
of structure.
Virtually every briefing these days on the character of insurgency or irregular warfare includes
a pyramid graphic illustrating the “hierarchy of
needs.” In the first half of the 20th century, psychologist Abraham Maslow developed a theory
for understanding human motivation, which he

(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)

to conventional combat, individuals are more often
mobilized to act because of their commitments to
other people rather than commitments to causes
and abstract ideals.
While some people participate in or support an
insurgency because of a principled dedication to the
cause, for many others being part of the insurgency
is basically an end unto itself. It gives them a sense
of purpose and an identity.51 The psychological
motive is primary, while the ideological/political
motive is secondary. However, even for those who
are “true believers,” the feeling of belonging often
has a powerful pull.52
It is no coincidence that the wellspring of most
resistance movements flows from a pool of alienated and angry young men. Modern small war
conflicts capitalize on identity-based security
threats, which are particularly incendiary issues
for that demographic category.53 Steven Metz and
Raymond Millen of the Strategic Studies Institute
note, “Insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment
by defiance, particularly among young males with
the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and
lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of
adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends
its political objectives.”54 With the global “youth

A Hezbollah supporter waves a Hezbollah flag during a rally of “Liberation Day,” which marks the withdrawal of the Israeli
army from southern Lebanon in 2000, Baalbek, Lebanon, 25 May 2011.
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based on a hierarchical constellation of human
needs. Most fundamental are basic physiological
needs like food and water. Just above that lies the
category of “safety” needs.56 As a practical matter,
those combined categories comprise the essence of
human security—freedom from want (physiological needs) and freedom from fear (safety needs).57
Insurgents create fear and disorder, then use
them to mobilize support. A climate of disorder
undermines confidence in the regime’s ability to
protect its citizens.58 Disorder can enhance fear
even more than increases in crime or actual risk of
harm.59 Civil conflicts, ethnic/religious tensions,
and drug trafficking all contribute to a community’s sense of fearful insecurity. “This sense of
insecurity has led to a growing realization that the
provision of security itself as a public good—the
very raison d’être of the states system—can no
longer be guaranteed by that system.”60
Fear often works as a tactic when the fearinducing message includes a proposed solution
or an option for security.61 Between the regime
and the counterinsurgent, whoever appears to
be in control—or appears uncontrollable by the
other—will have an upper hand in managing the
climate of community safety and the security of the
populace.62 The state that does not govern, secure,
or take care of its people abdicates its power to
those who will.
A wrinkle in the contemporary challenge is that
insurgent groups now not only seek to manipulate
and dominate the threats to community security,
but also increasingly seek to offer services and
solutions.63 Hezbollah has been an exemplar of
this approach, though it is certainly not the only
group to use it.64 Hezbollah is perhaps best known
in the West for its persistent and horrific acts of
terrorism, including its association with the pivotal
suicide bombings of U.S. Marine Corps barracks
in Beirut, which arguably ushered in the modern
era of suicide terrorism. Hezbollah also has a significant network of social and medical services,
which it creates and sustains in areas with great
need and deficient infrastructure. When illness or
crisis threatens, victims often have little choice
but to turn to Hezbollah and its facilities for help.
Hezbollah will help with a generous spirit, without
requiring allegiance or demanding reciprocity.
It does not impose services on the population or
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2011

tell the citizens what they need. Rather, Hezbollah identifies the needs and gaps neglected by the
state, builds capacity, and attracts those in need.
(The idea of using attraction rather than promotion is a subtlety often lost on counterinsurgents.)
Hezbollah has learned that securing the population
from want also secures their loyalty and support.

Conclusion

We should take a step back from our current
obsession with “terrorism” and the next “big
attack” and keep an eye on disorderly, ungoverned
spaces; the evolving character of armed groups
and nonstate collectives; and the erosive, insidious damage rendered to global security by the
thousand small cuts of community conflict.
Wars are “primarily human endeavors.” Small
wars are less amenable, however, to nation-centric
analysis. Neither our adversary nor his armed
forces are monolithic. We may need to modify our
traditional “center of gravity” analysis to accommodate multiple centers of gravity in an asymmetric diffusion of power. Insurgencies and movements of resistance are dynamic, living systems
powered by social dynamics.65 Successful insurgent movements leverage their available sources of
power to gain the sympathy of the broader population and to mobilize a small cadre of armed forces.
For the insurgent, these dynamics—the power of
rising expectations, the power of the people, the
power of the underdog, the power of agility, the
power of resistance, the power of security, and
the power of belonging—become the pillars of
small war power. For the counterinsurgent, each
of these pillars presents both a potential hazard
and an exploitable vulnerability.
General James Mattis said of the U.S. effort in
Iraq, “Sometimes wars are won by the side that
makes the fewest mistakes, and the enemy made
mistake after mistake after mistake. And we, on
our side, when we saw we made a mistake, we
corrected ourselves. And so the enemy is working
amongst the population, and eventually the people
identified that we were the ones doing things
right and that the enemy was working against the
people’s best interest. So they turned on them.”66
In Iraq, U.S. forces arguably prevailed by undermining and toppling the insurgency’s pillars of
power. MR
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